Series is a forum for stimulating discussion and eliciting feedback on ongoing and recently completed research and policy studies undertaken by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) staff, consultants, or resource persons. The series deals with key economic and development problems, particularly those facing the Asia and Pacific region; as well as conceptual, analytical, or methodological issues relating to project/program economic analysis, and statistical data and measurement. The series aims to enhance the knowledge on Asia's development and policy challenges; strengthen analytical rigor and quality of ADB's country partnership strategies, and its subregional and country operations; and improve the quality and availability of statistical data and development indicators for monitoring development effectiveness.
I. Introduction
World merchandise trade volume is widely projected to decline at nearly a double-digit annual rate in 2009. 1 The collapse of trade has reached alarming proportions in the first quarter of 2009, estimated by the World Bank to be -25% in volume terms, measured year-on-year against the same quarter of 2008. International trade of the United States (US) has undergone a wrenching decline with negative growth in constant prices accelerating for exports since the second quarter of 2008 and for imports since the third quarter of the same year (Figure 1 ). In the second quarter of 2009, both US exports and imports posted modest gains on the previous quarter. The US current account balance has noticeably lessened in the period since the deficit peaked in 2006 when measured relative to US gross domestic product (GDP), mainly as a result of growth in net exports. However, most of the reduction from the third quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009 appears to be because imports are declining faster than exports. 2 In nominal terms, the decline in imports is largely due to the sharp reduction in crude oil prices between midyear 2008 and the first half of 2009. Measured in constant prices, US domestic exports from the first to the second quarters of 2009 are matching or even exceeding the decline in US imports for consumption (compare the right panels of Tables 1 and 2 , first row). 3 The US is certainly not alone as trade-oriented economies across the globe are feeling the effects of the collapse of world demand in the wake of the economic crisis.
Developing Asian countries, particularly the newly-industrialized economies (Republic of Korea [Korea] ; Hong Kong, China; Singapore; and Taipei,China), have experienced sharp reversals of fortune and steep contraction in both exports and imports. The contraction is also hitting Japan very hard. The synchronized nature of this crisis among the Group of Three (G3-the European Union [EU] , US, and Japan) is at the core of the problem from the standpoint of export-oriented developing Asia. The collapse in demand in the main markets for final goods assembled within "factory Asia" was driving the drastic cutback in manufacturing production in the region, as firms sharply reduced inventories in the first half of 2009. Demand contraction in the G3 is also the cause of the collapse of intra-Asian manufacturing trade as demand for imported intermediate goods (parts and components), particularly for durables, is derived from demand for final goods in the G3.
This paper explores the impact of the crisis on US international merchandise trade, both imports and exports. Trade in services is excluded as detailed statistics on trade in services are not available on a timely enough basis. For example, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has only recently released annual statistics on trade in a limited number of service sectors for 2007 and for other services data are only available for 2006. Hence, one can only speculate on the impact the crisis is having on services trade, although there can be no doubt that trade in financial services and shipping services is contracting.
The effort by the US to establish a network of bilateral free trade agreements in an attempt to secure liberalized market access for US exports (and to reward allies in the "war on terror") in the absence of a new multilateral trade agreement is critically examined for its durability in the face of the crisis. The paper is organized as follows. Section II examines the pattern of US trade with major preferential partners compared with developing Asia and other main non-preferential partners. Section III presents two cases of industries within the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that have relatively high rates of protection, feature highly restrictive rules of origin (autos and textiles), and are of interest to developing Asia. It includes an in-depth case study of US trade in textiles and apparel and dissects the effects of the elimination of quotas under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, as well as the regime of safeguards that were negotiated with the People's Republic of China (PRC) that further restricted access to the US market from 2006 to 2008. Section IV concludes the paper.
Other components of the US current account, such as income remittances and receipts from services may explain continued improvement in the current account deficit relative to GDP. One needs only to fly over Singapore to see hundreds of cargo vessels lying idle to realize that demand for services closely associated with trade in goods has contracted. However, at present, no one knows the impact in terms of the growth rate of trade in commercial services. 
II. Direction of US Trade: Preferential and Non-Preferential Trade
The National Bureau for Economic Research (NBER) has identified December 2007 as the beginning of the current recession (NBER 2008) . The collapse in US industrial production and GDP growth that began in the fourth quarter of 2007 (Figures 2 and 3) were soon mirrored by declines in the same indicators in the other two major North American economies, Canada and Mexico. Mexico, in particular, was hit hard by the US plunge into recession. The transmission of the US economic deterioration to its two large trading partners in North America was principally through international trade since Canada and Mexico had very limited direct exposure to US toxic securities. International trade was initially propping up US growth during 2008 as exports continued to rise in both current and constant prices (Table 2) US imports under preferential free trade agreements started to contract earlier than imports as a whole when examined quarter-on-quarter and, measured year-on-year, contracted more rapidly than US imports from the world. Quarter-on-quarter imports from partners in NAFTA began to slide in the third quarter of 2008, even as overall imports from the world continued to expand. For the first 8 months of 2009, all US imports from NAFTA partners declined more rapidly than imports from all suppliers (-22.4% vs. -19 .1% constant prices).
The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) publishes import data by special import program, including "free trade" (preferential) agreements such as NAFTA. US exports to NAFTA partners (in constant prices) have also contracted more sharply than US exports to all trading partners in the world (Table 2 , bottom section, rows 1 and 2), whether measured in nominal or real terms. For all FTA partners, the collapse in US exports is -23.5% in the 8 eight months of 2009 (constant prices) compared with -21.3% for all destinations and -19.4% for all major non-preferential destinations. 5 US exports to non-preferential partners in developing Asia also contracted less than those to FTA partners in 2009 (-20.3% vs. -23.5%).
Year-on-year detail of the direction of trade for imports and exports underscores the point that US preferential trade appears to be collapsing more rapidly than trade with partners ineligible for preferential treatment, thus raising the question of whether preferences have encouraged trade diversion in the past during the boom. The possibility that NAFTA diverted large amounts of trade from nonmember countries in relatively highly protected and high-cost sectors in Canada, Mexico, and the US is a cause for concern (Romalis 2005) . This diverted trade appears to be unwinding rapidly in the face of the severe economic downturn. 6
III. What is the Matter with Trade within NAFTA? Case Studies of Autos and Textiles
The reasons underlying the more rapid contraction of trade under US bilateral free trade agreements than trade under the auspices of most-favored nation (MFN) tariffs are not difficult to identify. 7 In manufacturing trade (which represents the overwhelming share of merchandise trade receiving preferential treatment), two sectors come immediately to mind and will be the focus of the bulk of this paper. They are the two manufacturing sectors that had the strongest lobbies during the negotiation of NAFTA and most other US bilateral talks-autos and textiles. Together, these sectors accounted for 28% of US merchandise imports that entered the US market under NAFTA preferences in 2007, and although this share dropped to 25% in 2008, preferential trade was still heavily weighted toward these sectors even during the severe recession. 8
The so-called "Big 3" auto giants (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) were very active in the NAFTA negotiations (Cameron and Tomlin 2000) . The rules that determine if a good is eligible or not for preferential tariff treatment under the NAFTA were a key focus of lobbyist activity on behalf of the US automakers and textile producers-the rules of origin. 9 The rules of origin for autos within NAFTA are highly restrictive and subject to a graduated increase in regional content requirements that ended up at 62.5% of the value of the physical components that are used to assemble a finished vehicle. 10 It is not just the rules themselves, however, that is the sticking point-it is also how the rules are administered. In the case of autos, the Big 3 wanted not only to restrict imports from non-NAFTA members but also to inhibit the movement of vehicles produced by rival transplants already operating within the borders of NAFTA members-such as Honda Motors. 11 Hence, there are complex tracing requirements that are designed to make it difficult for Honda to take advantage of NAFTA preferential trade even when major components such as engines, drive-trains, and chassis and bodies are assembled or otherwise produced within the US, Canada, or Mexico.
The textile industry in the form of the American Textile Manufacturers Institute (ATMI) was also hugely influential in the negotiation of rules of origin for textiles and apparel (Cameron and Tomlin 2000) . The Mexican industry was similarly disposed to favor restrictive rules of origin in return for the US to phase out quotas on imports of apparel from Mexico well in advance of quota elimination under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). Not only that, but unlike in the case of autos, rules of origin in textiles were negotiated directly by the textile committee instead of the rules of origin committee. Consequently, the textiles rules of origin became known as "Neanderthal" (Cameron and Tomlin, 2000) . They amount to practically a 100% regional content rule, with exceptions only for some fabrics and yarns not at all produced within NAFTA borders (e.g., silk fabric). The yarn-forward rule means that an article of apparel must undergo a tripletransformation beginning with yarn that must be spun within North America to be woven or knit into fabric (including dyeing and finishing) and then finally be assembled into apparel to be eligible for duty-free tariff treatment. 12 The incentive to operate within such a restrictive rules regime is not hard to discern-US most-favored nation tariffs involving apparel made of synthetic fiber fabrics peak at over 30% and average applied MFN tariffs for apparel from non-preferential sources are over 14% and those on textiles exceed 10% (James 2007) .
10 Mexico had local content requirements in its auto sector that served to protect the interests of its parts and components producers-the largest employer and owned by Mexican nationals (Cameron and Tomlin 2000) . The US negotiators won over the Mexicans by agreeing to a gradual, transitional phase out of the local content requirements with a promise that US automakers would source parts and components from Mexico in return. 11 According to Cameron and Tomilin (2000) the Canadian negotiators wanted to retain the 50% rule that was agreed under the previous FTA and the auto pact between the US and Canada to enable Canada-based Honda plants to continue to compete in the US market and to improve access in Mexico. Destler (2006) provides a similar alternative explanation of how 62.5% was arrived at but also notes the interest of the Canadian and Mexican governments in access for transplants to the US market (as well as for each other's markets). No one disputes the critical role of the "Big " in influencing the outcome. 12 The US textile lobby has also succeeded in imposing highly restrictive rules of origin in other agreements offering preferential access to the US market for apparel including under the various unilateral nonreciprocal agreements such as the Andean Pact, among others. For discussion see Rivoli (2005 This type of "imported protection" is a result of highly restricted rules of origin coupled with substantial preference margins and has led to the conclusion that such arrangements will make it more difficult for the US to agree to multilateral liberalization because the effects of MFN tariff liberalization on output and price declines would be magnified (Limao 2006; Romalis 2005) . The impact of a severe recession on highly protected and inefficient sectors with substantial trade within NAFTA may also have been magnified by previous large trade diversion.
Automotive Trade Case Study. With the onset of the crisis in the US auto sector, trade in motor vehicles and components is in a state of collapse with cumulative (JanuaryAugust) 2009 imports and exports within NAFTA being nearly halved from the same period in 2008 (Table 3 ). In the case of 2009 imports of automotive parts and components with Canada, there is virtually no difference with the decline in imports of built-up units (Table 3, Over 93% of US imports of auto parts come under NAFTA preferences in 2007 and the share of built-up vehicle imports is over 99%. 1 Combined together, automotive imports from NAFTA partners that take advantage of NAFTA or auto pact preferences are over 95% of total automotive imports from Canada and Mexico (Table 4) . This compares with a ratio of just over 50% for imports from these partners as a whole. The reason for the high proportion of preferential trade in total is that within automotive production networks, auto parts and components are repeatedly transshipped across borders, magnifying the value of the small margins of preference on single transactions. Automotive imports also figure prominently in US imports from Japan and help explain the sharp contraction in US imports from Japan as the crisis has deepened. Table 3 shows that automotive imports from Japan declined in 2009 year to date by over -53% compared to -38 percent for all imports (Table 1 left panel row 3) from Japan. Globally, the contraction in US automotive imports is only matched by the collapse in energyrelated imports.
US exports of automotive parts and components are substantially greater than of built-up vehicles in trade with NAFTA partners-a reverse of the trend in global US auto exports where vehicles dominate. The explanation for this is that rules of origin enforce purchases of US intermediate inputs in partner countries and serve to divert trade from more efficient suppliers outside the FTA. The margin of preference between most favored nation applied tariffs and NAFTA preferential tariffs in Canada and Mexico provides additional incentive to source inputs from US components suppliers. Rules of origin act as an export subsidy for US parts and components suppliers. 15 This relationship superficially appears to be strengthening in the crisis in the sense that parts and components exports from the US to NAFTA partners are declining much less sharply than are built-up vehicles. However, the preferential trade agreement appears to provide no respite from the collapse of global trade and indeed in the case of auto parts and vehicles, the decline in NAFTA trade is in line with that from all destinations (right hand panel of Table 3 ). However, the automotive sector's trade occupies a larger share of US intra-NAFTA trade than it does in US global trade. Automotive imports comprised 14% of US intra-NAFTA imports in 2007 but only 9% of US gobal imports. This helps explain why US intra-NAFTA imports are falling faster than US global imports.
Textile Trade Case Study. The most significant change in global trade rules brought about by the Uruguay Round Agreement was the phasing out of industrialized country quotas on textile and apparel imports from developing countries over a 10-year period (1995-200) under the ATC. 16 The elimination of quotas, coupled with the entry of PRC into the WTO plus the normalization of trade relations between the US and Viet Nam greatly undercut the advantage preferential suppliers had in the US market for textiles and clothing. Without the quantitative restrictions, producers in Canada and Mexico would be forced to compete directly with Asian suppliers with only preferential tariffs even though applied MFN tariffs in the US remained quite high. 17 Globally, it was predicted that the number of competitive suppliers would shrink and that exports would be consolidated into just a few countries led by PRC, India, and perhaps a few others (Nordas 200) . The extension of preferential arrangements by the US to new FTA partners in the 15 See Cadot, Estevadeordal, and Suwa-Eisenmann (2006) for a detailed explanation and empirical verification of the proposition that rules of origin act as trade-diverting export subsidies. James and Umemoto (2000) and Krueger (1997) and Krishna and Krueger (1995) provide theoretical models of FTA diversion of trade in intermediate goods. 16 For a discussion of the ATC and its implications for global trade in textiles and apparel, see Nordas (200) . See
James (2005) and Whalley (2006) for the implications for developing Asia. 17 James (2007) estimates that the average tariff margin of preference for NAFTA suppliers compared with nonpreferential was about 1% for clothing and 10% for textiles in 2005.
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) 18 and to poor sub-Saharan Africa under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) can be interpreted as a means of preserving a share of the US market for more developing countries that desperately needed to generate jobs and foreign exchange revenues. 19 The impact of the full implementation of the ATC on US imports of textiles and apparel from NAFTA partners was negative (Table 5 ). There was negative growth in US imports overall beginning in 2005 with substantially large impacts on apparel imports, which fell by about 10%. The impact was similar on imports of apparel that used NAFTA preferences that fell by over 7% in 2005 (Table 5 ). In contrast to apparel, US imports of textile intermediate products and made-up textile products from NAFTA partners continued to expand slowly in 2005 but by 2006 turned broadly negative. The share of imports of textiles and apparel imports from Canada and Mexico that complied with NAFTA rules to avoid high MFN tariffs remained high at about 83-85% (Table 6 ). 18 The CAFTA was extended to the Dominican Republic, hence the CAFTA-DR acronym. 19 The CAFTA-DR includes Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
The entry into force of CAFTA differs according to the date of ratification of the treaty by partner countries. AGOA provided limited duty-free access to the US market for imports from 7 sub-Saharan African countries. In 2006, another major change was introduced in the global trading system for textiles and apparel that would potentially set back the clock on the reforms introduced by the ATC. This was the imposition over 2006-2008 of newly negotiated safeguard quotas on selected fast-growing textile and apparel exports from the PRC by the Government of the US and by the European Community, among others. 20 In the US case, these new quotas restricted imports for items accounting for about 50% of all US imports of textiles and apparel (Table 7) . Imports of these restricted items from the PRC (see Appendix for details) were growing at the spectacular rate of 47% in 2005 in volume before the safeguard quotas were imposed. 21 The dramatic impact on US imports for the covered items can be seen in the drastic decline in volume growth to just over 1% in 2006 (Table 7) . In value terms, the decline in growth was from just over 50% in 2005 to 16.7% in 2006 (Table 8) 22 The quotas are implemented on the basis of the volume and not the value of shipments. In general, the imposition of quotas may have a more restrictive impact on volume than on value as prices of the restricted items tend to rise under the quota regime (see Figure 5 for an example). The safeguard quotas led to substantial gains for some suppliers but not others. For example, major Asian suppliers such as Cambodia and Indonesia saw their shipments of the items restricted by safeguard quotas on the PRC soar in 2006 in both volume and value terms (Tables 7 & 8 ). In contrast, less competitive suppliers did less well and preferential suppliers fared worst of all in volume of shipments, except for landlocked suppliers like Mongolia and Nepal. The performance of US partners in FTAs (Figure 4) was far worse than that of all suppliers. Thus, when the PRC was held back by quotas, it was the more competitive Asian suppliers that filled the gap, rather than those that had sought better preferential access to the US market through bilateral agreementsreflecting the disadvantage preferential partners endure of having to use higher cost intermediate textile products in complying with strict US rules of origin. In terms of value, noncompetitive suppliers almost across the board (including preferential suppliers and Asian newly industrialized economies) experienced negative growth and lost market share. The safeguard quotas allowed for growth in the volume of shipments from the PRC in 2007 and 2008 and also had the effect of raising unit values of PRC's shipments in the restricted categories. This led to a recovery of growth in PRC's exports in 2007, before the onset of the recession led to a fall in US consumer demand. In 2008, as the PRC began to experience higher costs and began to reflect the previous modest appreciation of the yuan relative to the US dollar and the US recession began to hurt trade in the latter part of the year, growth in the volume of shipments turned negative with value growth falling very sharply to low single-digits compared with over 20% in 2007.
The volume of shipments from preferential suppliers continued to underperform in 2007 and 2008 and shipments from some other Asian suppliers also began to crumble (especially in the case of the Philippines). Bangladesh, Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, and Viet Nam continued to experience high growth in shipments of the restricted items throughout 2007 and 2008. The fact that many suppliers were experiencing difficulties while only a few were able to grow rapidly may indicate the consolidation of the world textile and apparel industry is gaining traction. The global recession and the collapse of the US consumer market that began in earnest late in 2008 and that accelerated in early 2009 may further advance the prospects for consolidation.
The US market for imported apparel is vast and is rivaled only by the combined market of the 27 member countries of the EU. In 2007, the US imported $7 billion in apparel and a further $22 billion in textiles for a total of $96 billion. Moreover, the US apparel market had been growing relative to textile imports over the period since the ATC eliminated quotas (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . And thus far in the recession, clothing imports have contracted less than textiles.
The rather mild decline in US clothing imports that characterized 2008, with volume and value falling at slightly different rates (Tables 9 & 10) Nonetheless, it is clear that downward pressure on prices, (unit values as proxies for prices), evident since 2006 (Table 11 ) is likely to worsen as 2009 unfolds. As an example, the US market for cotton-knit blouses may be considered as representative of how changes in the trade policy regime influence trade patterns and prices. First is the observation that elimination of the quota system under the ATC did lead to cheaper prices and especially in a huge fall in prices of cotton blouses from the PRC (compare unit values in Table 11 top row between 200 and 2005). However, the implementation of safeguard quotas on the PRC reversed some of the decline in prices that had taken place and drove prices steadily higher until the quotas were once again done away with at the end of 2008 ( Figure 5 ). The overall trend, since the global crisis had begun to sharply affect trade in late 2008 and early 2009, is for downward pressure on prices and a smaller volume of trade as demand by US consumers' contracts. There is also evidence of a renewed drive toward consolidation of exports of clothing toward fewer suppliers with the PRC in the lead. The ending of the safeguard quotas led to a massive surge in shipments of cotton-knit blouses from the PRC but Bangladesh and Indonesia were also able to raise the volume at double-digit rates even into a market that is down. Shipments from the Asian newly industrialized economies NIEs, the EU, and all preferential suppliers are falling much more rapidly than the global average (see the last column of Table 11 ). It appears that market shares are also consolidating (Table 12 ) with few clear winners (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Viet Nam, and PRC) and many losers-especially preferential suppliers but also landlocked suppliers-the EU, Asian NIEs, and most other Asian suppliers including those that had benefited from the quotas on the PRC. Large South Asian economies such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan are breaking even but are now facing severe negative effects from the collapse in external demand for their apparel exports. US exports of textiles comprise close to three-quarters of total US exports of textiles and apparel (Table 13 ) and growth in the value of US textile exports was sustained through the post-quota years, [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . US apparel exports have been shrinking even before the global crisis. The picture that is emerging in 2009, however, is different. US exports of intermediate textile products are collapsing more rapidly than are final textile and apparel products (Table 13) . Moreover, US exports are falling just as rapidly across major destinations whether they enjoy preferential treatment or not (Table 1 ) with a rate of decline of over 25% in the first 8 months of 2009 compared with that in the same period in 2008. Thus, even though preferential rules of origin may act as export subsidies, they are no insurance policy against a global economic downturn. 
Sub-Total Non-Preferential Partners
The relatively small number of textile workers in the US compared with the vastly larger number of workers engaged in retail trade dependent on imported clothing would seem to militate against continued protectionism. And looked at from the entire value chain in the global clothing and textile industry, greater profit seems to lie in fashion design, advertisement, and other related services rather than in manufacturing. This perspective helps explain the seeming contradiction between protectionism (aimed at keeping textile workers employed) and the extending of unilateral preferences to less developed countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere. The unilateral preference programs themselves include complex rules that may vitiate the purpose of aiding the development of poorer countries by offering them limited market access on a duty-free basis (Matoo, Roy and Subramanian 2002) . The reform of rules of origin is likely to be an important step in reviving the manufacture of clothing for export from poorer countries and ensuring that such trade is not distorted to serve US textile interests. The steps taken by Canada and the European Community to revamp their rules governing preferential access through the Generalized System of Preferences for least developed countries are in the right direction. 23 The simplification of the rules to allow duty free access for clothing items assembled in developing countries with no requirements regarding intermediate inputs is easing market access for poor countries that have difficulty reaching high value added thresholds and that lack textile capacities of their own.
IV. Conclusions
The trend towards bilateralism has claimed too much and delivered too little. The current economic crisis reveals that preferential trade is even less robust than MFN trade and is likely to have fueled animosities rather than greater cooperation on critical issues facing the global community. 2 It is high time that strategy be refocused to emphasize the global trading system and the necessity of urgently moving forward with the multilateral negotiations. The world can hardly hope to cope with the crises besetting it unless it can at least agree to move forward with the agenda of development. Reducing wasteful subsidies and other harmful practices that punish peasant farmers and garment workers in developing countries and providing improved market access to manufacturing and agricultural products of developing countries in exchange for more liberalization of services trade and investment makes sense for most WTO members.
2 The EU allows regional cumulation within recognized regional integration agreements such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in complying with its rules of origin. For detailed discussion see Textiles Intelligence (September-October 2008: 18-15) . 2 Witness the recent disputes between the US and Mexico over the implementation of NAFTA rules on land transport and the endless dispute between Canada and the US over softwood lumber. In the case of transport, the US refuses to permit trucks from Mexico to engage in providing transport services within the US, sparking Mexico to retaliate by imposing penalty tariffs on US exports. When Canada won the NAFTA panel decision on softwood lumber on an antidumping case, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) simply filed the case at the WTO.
The economic crisis is also likely to shift the balance in US trade policy formulation away from protectionist domestic interests in favor of more outward-looking interests including export-oriented producers of both goods and internationally traded services. Renewal of the traditional US emphasis on the multilateral trading system rather than bilateralism may also take place as the restoration of American growth and employment will have to generate growth in net exports at the global level. US global export interests can no longer be held hostage to bilateral arrangements to protect sunset industries.
It is far from certain whether recovery will begin anytime soon and, as unemployment mounts, there will be demand for more, not less, protectionism. If the US can successfully resist such sentiments, it may be possible to move forward with a multilateral trade agreement. Research on the implications for global trade of the elimination of all quantitative restrictions on textiles and garments, the rising incidence of contingent forms of protection on various key tradable goods, and the future of US automotive trade are likely to provide more insights and support the agenda for a renewed emphasis on multilateralism.
